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MR. LOMBORG AND THE COMMON

LAW
Bruce Yandlet
INTRODUCTION

While it is still too early to say, it is entirely possible that the
publication of Bjorn Lomborg's book, The Skeptical Environmen-

talist,1 will someday be viewed as a watershed event that contributed mightily to the end of the rise of centralized command-andcontrol of environmental use and the resurgence of decentralized
management of environmental use under a rule of law. Although
2
this is not the first documentation of environmental improvement,
his is clearly the most complete. As the work of an apostate, one
converted from pessimism to optimism, it is even more persuasive
and therefore the most powerful. Add to this timing, a time when
the limits of command-and-control regulation are being reached,
and recognition of the virtues of decentralization and market incentives are moving to fore, and Lomborg's book becomes a veritable tour de force.3
In an exchange following a discussion of his work at Washington's Competitive Enterprise Institute, Lomborg explained how
an intellectual encounter with the work of the late Julian Simon
inspired the book. Lomborg wanted to see if it was possible that
Simon's positive description of the state of the world could possibly be accurate. The book is the result.
Senior Associate, PERC, and Profoessor of Economics Emeritus, Clemson University.
BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OF THE WORLD (Cambridge University Press 2001) (1998).
2 See, e.g., EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ron
Bailey ed. 2000); STEVEN HAYWARD & JULIE MAJERES, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE'S INed. 2002), available at
DEX OF LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL- INDICATORS (7th

(last
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/enviro/ei2002-states/pri-enviro-index-2002.pdf
visited Nov. 18, 2002).
3 The fact that Lomborg's book has created a firestorm of criticism and controversy
within environmental circles, and that the Danish Committees on Scientific Dishonesty on January 7, 2003 ruled his book to be "systematically one-sided" adds to the growing interest in learning what Lomborg has to say. Major elements of this debate are reported on Lomborg's website, www.lomborg.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
4 Lomborg discusses his encounter with Julian Simon's ideas and the reactions to his
book, both positive and negative, in an interview at Competitive Enterprise Institute. See Q&A
with Bjorn Lomborg: Author of the Skeptical Environmentalist, CEI UPDATE, Dec. 2001, at 8-9.
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But while the book is an empirical encyclopedia on world environmental quality, it also delivers something of a statement
about people and what they did and can do to make things better.
Near the end of the book, speaking to the question of why things
have gone so well, Lomborg tells us that the positive outcome for
the environment did not derive from massive world sessions with
worry beads:
Things have gone so well because we have worked hard to
improve our situation. In some circumstances this has happened almost automatically, as in the continued growth of
economic wealth. We have become richer and richer primarily because of our fundamental organization in a market
economy and not because we have worried. 5
Lomborg recognizes that regulation has made things better in
some cases, but it was because of priorities, not the regulation per
se, that things improved. One might paraphrase by saying it was
definition and enforcement of property rights, regulatory 6 and private, that contributed to meaningful environmental improvement.
His story is about people living in diverse countries building diverse institutions to get beyond the prospect of a tragedy of the
commons. Indeed, the prospect of the tragedy seems to have become a prelude to plenty.
Is there a link between Lomborg's optimistic environmental
assessment and common law? I feel strongly that there is, but the
linkage is obviously not direct in the sense that he discusses the
importance of a rule of law. The linkage I see is about decentralized versus centralized institutions for defining and protecting
property rights and what that may mean for wealth creation. This
translates into choices as between common and statute law for
dealing with environmental problems, the legal framework, if you
will, within which Lomborg's assessment is made.
In this Article, I will first lay a foundation by discussing
stages and elements of the environmental saga that began to
Lomborg's position is captured in the name ascribed to his book, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. He indicates that he deliberately chose a title to
serve as counterpoint to another best seller, The State of the World, a widely read annual publication of Worldwatch Institute. As he takes the reader through reams of charts and data, Lomborg debunks a number of pessimistic assertions found in the Worldwatch publication.
5 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 351.
6 Commentators have discussed regulatory property rights. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677
(1999). Wiener fully develops the notion of regulatory property rights and differentiates this
from private property rights. An example of regulatory property rights is seen in discharge
permits issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Without the permit, which is not
transferable but nonetheless valuable, a plant cannot discharge effluent into a river or stream.
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emerge in the United States and the developed world in the 1960s.
This was the saga that began with environmental plenty, experienced a number of serious tragedies that then helped form an emotional, if not a scientific, basis for ushering in large bodies of statute law. In some cases, the new statute law dismissed common
law protection. 7 In every instance, the dominant statute law imposed new constraints on environmental use. Bad news and
environmental pessimism, was important in all of this. A
continuing flow of bad news about the environment provided a
basis for continued growth of centralized environmental control.
The stages of environmental activity I describe will then be
linked to certain elements of Environmental Kuznets Curves
(EKCs), 8 those statistical artifacts that describe relationships between income and environmental quality. Then, the more interesting parts of the EKCs will be related to property rights institutions
and the protections provided by common law. This decidedly
richer-is-cleaner story will make the final connection between Mr.
Lomborg and the Common Law.
I.

THE STAGES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAGA

In 1977, I began an outline of what I called the stages of the
environmental saga.9 Now, after almost 30 years to think about
the outline, I have some additional ideas. Thinking in terms of
stages, it seems that the story about environmental institution
building began as the first stage was ending. I call the first stage
Manna from Heaven. The expression is an attempt to capture the
notion of environmental plenty, that happy time when the initial
natural endowment of water and air quality, to take two examples,
was ample enough either fully to assimilate wastes or to provide
new low-cost locations when the older sites have been depleted of
the environmental assets. Manna from Heaven begins with plenty
and extends to the point where custom, tradition, and decentralized
private law and statutes slowly emerge as ways to manage conflicts over environmental use.

7 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding common law in
interstate disputes was replaced by statute law protections). For discussion of similar Canadian
experience, see ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE (1995).
8 For an explanation and background on EKCs, see BRUCE YANDLE ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: A PRIMER (Political Economy Research Center, PERC Research

Studies No. 02-1, 2002), available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02_l.pdf

[hereinafter ENVI-

RONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVES].

9 For a discussion of the "environmental saga," see HUGH H. MACAULAY & BRUCE
YANDLE, ENVIRONMENTAL USE AND THE MARKET (1977).
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I term the second stage Common Law & Community Environmentalism. 10 During this period of evolving order, land rights
emerge, along with rules of law for contracting land use and transfers.' Common law seems to have entered the property rights lexicon as a part of feudal land law. In time, the same common law
expands to provide rules that protect the owners of riparian land
who might be damaged by upstream dischargers of waste. Eventually, the common law extends to protect holders of land rights
from nuisance or trespass formed by air pollution, always tending
to do so where environmental scarcity is more severe.
Stage two is characterized by a relatively smooth evolutionary
process that yields institutions tending to encourage the formation
and preservation of wealth, including environmental protection.
Common law rules emerge as environmental scarcity threatens the
wealth of holders of land and other rights. Environmental assets
become subject to contracts, and environmental rights become recognizable components of the bundle of sticks that define property.
Common Law & Community Environmentalism ends when crises
occur that seemingly cannot be handled by the property rights institutions available at the time. In some cases, this is because of
the need for collective as opposed to private action. In other cases,
the transition to centralized political decision making is made because doing so is politically profitable. Stage three is called the
period of Holy Water.
Holy Water does not come simultaneously for all environmental assets and uses. The transition may come first for air quality in some locations, for water quality in others, for land-based
assets in still other locations. For example, water quality in the
Ruhr broke across the divide at the end of the 1 9 th century, following a devastating typhoid outbreak. 12 A similar crossing occurred
for the Ohio River in the 1940s, after serious problems with gastroenteritis.13 Air quality, always troublesome in Los Angeles due
to geological and atmospheric features, made the shift in Califor-

"I For a discussion of common law environmentalism, see Roger E. Meiners & Bruce
Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. CHOICE 49 (1998).
11 For a discussion on some of these issues, see Bruce Yandle, Escaping Environmental
Feudalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517 (1992); Bruce Yandle, Organic Constitutions and
the Common Law, 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 225 (1991).
12 BRUCE YADDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 34
(1997).
13 ROBERT CLEARLY, THE ORSANCO STORY (1967).
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nia in the 1950s when smog first appeared. 14 And toxic chemical
use moved to stage three following the Bophal tragedy. 15
The selection of the name for stage three is not a casual
choice. Holy Water has mysterious powers to harm human populations. Because of the unknown harms that can be done to and by
the environment, it is almost, if not fully, deserving of worship. 6
Where stage two was characterized by evolving environmental use
and rights for use, stage three is about restrictions, fear of unknown harms, stepping back and avoiding use, cost to those who
make forbidden use, and benefits to the new priestly cast that
guards the environment. Political voices in stage three call upon
government to do what governments are formed to do - to provide
for the public welfare by protecting human communities from environmental harms.
The statutes that emerge with Holy Water are built on bad
news. Fear, not facts, becomes the driving force. For example, the
1980 Global 2000 Report to the Presidentoffers this gloomy outlook:
If the present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be
more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and
more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now.
Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material
output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways than
they are today.17
With such gloom in official forecasts, it is no wonder that water pollution control legislation calls for the elimination of all human discharge to rivers and streams,' 8 that parts of air quality con14 See Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 77, 78 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000).
15 Mariela Mercedes & Nino Restrepo, Evaluationof Toxic Release Inventory Data Using

Risk Assessment Techniques, in THE MARKET MEETS THE ENVIRONMENT 85, 85 (Bruce Yandle
ed., 1999).
16 Jason Annan, Is Environmentalisma New State Religion?, in THE MARKET MEETS THE
ENVIRONMENT supra note 15, at 295 (arguing that "[tioday's modem environmental movement
possesses many of the traits of organized religion); Robert H. Nelson, Bruce Babbitt, Pipeline to
the Almighty, WKLY STANDARD, June 24, 1996, at 17 (discussing Bruce Babbitt, then Secretary
of the Interior, who believes that he is carrying out God's instructions through his environmental
policies); Robert H. Nelson, Does "Existence Value" Exist?, INDEP. REV., Spring 1997, at 499,
518 (arguing that the "existence of value amounts to a Trojan horse. Seeming for a time to
sustain the social role of economics, in the long run it can only help undermine it."). But see
Brian Kropp, Environmental Organizations:What Makes them Tick?, in THE MARKET MEETS
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 15, at 259-93 (showing that membership in environmental organizations seems to be a substitute for membership in traditional religious organizations).
17 GERALD 0. BARNEY, GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT1 (1980).
18 A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-

MENTAL PROTECTION 169, 174 (Paul M. Portney ed., 2000).
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trol are based on the prevention of significant deterioration,19
which means the strictest possible technical standards, and that
toxic chemical control is predicated on the community's right to
know about any possible pending disaster. To make certain there
is a margin of safety, hazardous waste elimination is based on
cleanup standards that are the same as for drinking water. Stage
20
three carries with it a distinct flavor of environmental Calvinism.
It is Mr. Lomborg's period of worry.
During Holy Water stage, two property rights institutions are
pushed to one side and replaced by central authorities with command-and-control regulation. Statutes become the guardians of
nature's cathedral. Custom, tradition, and common law are not
viewed as severe or reliable enough. As stage three matures, the
real cost of implementing and living with a multitude of environmental regulations begins to be recognized. Along with cost recognition comes the beginning of understanding how ecological
systems work and what happens when various kinds of interventions occur. Little by little, fear of environmental use is replaced
with newly gained facts about how to manage environmental use.
As costs become visible, incentives for cost-effective management
gain some appreciation. Ultimately, recognition that commandand-control may not be necessary, or even desirable, for addressing every environmental concern begins to accompany calls for
reform, even a recapture of stage two institutions. This identifies
the early boundary of stage four, Economic Environment.
When environmental resources and consequences of their use
are better understood, when rapidly increasing costs are associated
with efforts to gain even trivial amounts of improvement by way
of technology-based standards, when local knowledge and incentives to improve are seen as being potentially superior to centralized knowledge and incentives, and when the merits of flexibility
and tailored institutions as opposed to one-suit-fits-all solutions
become part of the legitimate discourse, then Economic Environment has emerged. Elements of stage four thinking show up at
different times and places for the management of different environmental assets. For example, property rights and crude permit
trading for some air pollutants emerged in California's South
Coast in the late 1970s. 21 Permit trading then became the center19 For discussion of air quality policy, see Portney, supra note 14, at 85.
20 See Robert H. Nelson, Environmental Calvinism: The Judeo-Christian Roots of Eco-

theology, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 233 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle
eds., 1993) (comparing modem environmentalism to the theology of Martin Luther, John Calvin, and the Protestant Refirmation).
21 See Bruce Yandle, The Emerging Market in Air Emissions, REGULATION, July/Aug.
1978, at 21 (explaining that California's South Coast Air Quality Control Region was the loca-
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piece for controlling sulfur dioxide emissions throughout the Eastern United States in 1990.22 Contracting to reduce the cost of water pollution control entered the scene in North Carolina in the
early 1990s, 23 this after it was found that command-and-control
regulation simply would not solve serious fish kill problems. 24 A
resurgence of common law protection of environmental rights became apparent in hazardous waste litigation in the 1990s. 25 And an
announced intention to use markets and trading as a new foundation for U.S. water pollution control was made in 2002.26 Clearly,
we have entered the age of Economic Environment, which means
that at the margin, environmental policy will show greater tendency to be decentralized, to recognize opportunity cost and the
use of incentives, and to build on market forces as opposed to
seeking to muffle those forces.
This story about the modern environmental saga and its stages
implies that human populations regularly seek practical rules for
maintaining and improving life, that there is a wealth-conserving
force always at work, and that when events push human communities off the wealth-producing property rights path and new hardedged command-and-control institutions emerge, counter forces
will be triggered to pull communities back on path. Those forces
will be most effective in societies that respect constitutional principles that include private property protection under a rule of law.
Man, the institution builder, is always at work modifying wealthcreating and preserving institutions. But there is still more to the
story about institutions, preserving wealth, and the use of envition where the first experiments with air pollution offsets occurred, later to become EPA policy.
The offset mechaihism allowed expansion of air polluting firms if the firm could obtain more
than equal offsets from existing polluters for the same emissions to be released.).
22 Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1, 22 (1991).
21 See generally David W. Riggs, Market Incentives for Water Quality, in THE MARKET
MEETS THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 15, at 167 (discussing the factors leading to, and the
results of, the information of a water quality market to combat pollution in the Tar-Pamlico
watershed).
24 Id.
2 See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common
Law Remedies for Environmental Decline (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
For a discussion about this and resurgence generally, see also Denise Antolini, Modernizing
Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 Ecology L.Q. 755 (2001)
(discussing traditional public nuisance law and possible approaches to modernizing the law in
light of recent debates regarding appropriate remedies for environmental harms); Tom Kuhnle,
The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1996) (discussing the history of common law contamination actions and
the affects of hazardous waste regulations on such actions).
26 See generally Bruce Yandle & Brian Mannix, Public Interest Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Water Quality Trading Policy, Mercatus Center, at
http://www.mercatus.org/waterquality.pdf (June 26, 2002) (discussing E.P.A. proposal
67FR3409 and recommendations regarding future permit trading policies and regulations).
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ronmental assets. For fundamental institutional change to enter the
action agenda, calm and rational thought must have replaced fear,
pessimism, and religious sentiments about environmental use.
Hard and convincing data describing environmental progress must
surface. The Skeptical Environmentalistmay become as much of a
tour de force for this period as Silent Spring27 may have been for
the beginning of Holy Water.

II.

TRAVELING THE EKC IN STAGES

The stages of the environmental saga can be interpreted in
terms of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).28 First reported
in 199129 and now standard fare in environmental economics, the
EKC shows a mapping of income, such as per capita GDP, to some
specific measure of environmental quality, such as the concentration of sulfur dioxide in ambient air in particular locations. In its
general form, the EKC takes on an inverted-U shape. The conventional relationship shows three zones. In the first, the environment
is deteriorating as income rises from very low levels. This rising
leg of the inverted U corresponds to the final stages of Manna
from Heaven, that stage where use of the environment, within the
limits of custom, tradition, and private law, has allowed part of the
environmental endowment to be consumed. This is the period of
institutional construction for Common Law & Community Environmentalism. Following the inverted U, one can picture the approaching peak, a zone that corresponds to the end of rightprotected environmental use and the beginning of conservation and
recovery. The peak results from a combination of Common Law &
Community Environmentalism and Holy Water. It is here that statute law and federal regulation largely displace common law and
community control. Then, as the EKC progresses, the environment gets cleaner, always in association with rising income, thus
corresponding to Lomborg point that environmental progress has
been made "almost automatically, as in the continued growth of
economic wealth., 30 The downward-sloping leg of the inverted U
can be related to the stage of Economic Enviornment.
EKCs reflecting the inverted U shape have now been estimated for a diverse collection of measurements of environmental
27 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
28 For a recent discussion of the concept and survey of the EKC literature, see ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE, supra note 8.
29 GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF A NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.

3914, 1991), available at http://www.nber.org.
30 LOMBORG, supra note 1, 351.
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quality for air, water, and forestry. 3' However, it must be emphasized that some dimensions of environmental quality, that some
argue should be an important human concern, do not follow the
EKC model. Carbon emissions, for example, show an upwardsloping linear relationship with income for as far as data allow one
to observe. 32 Higher income means more carbon emissions, no
matter how the income is measured. If there is a turning point for
carbon, that point has not as yet been reached. This suggests that
there has been no Holy Water event for carbon emissions. Quite
possibly, the effects of the Kyoto Protocol and debates about climate change have not as yet entered the data.
There is a system of property rights for every nation that
might be included in an EKC estimate. However, more often than
not, the different property rights institutions are not accounted for
when estimates are made. That being so, it is not possible to say
what happens when communities impose stricter enforcement of
contracts, require that contracts be enforced, have constitutional
protections that limit government confiscation of property. Qin
made estimates of dimensions of air and water quality for a balanced panel of countries from developing to developed, controlling
for property rights protection. 33 His property rights variables are
adjusted for risk of property confiscation by government and the
degree to which contracts are enforced in courts of law. The results show environmental improvement came early for countries
with stronger property rights enforcement. The results also show
that deterioration was not as severe where property rights were
stronger. With EKC learning telling us that richer is cleaner and
that property rights enforcement matters, it is not a long leap to
suggest that common law enforcement of contracts and protection
of environmental rights helps to avoid the worst of the tragedies
and brings environmental improvement sooner.
Indur Goklany has done fundamental work on human wellbeing around the world, and his findings are consistent with those
found in the EKC literature.34 He has also researched extensively
the condition of U.S. air quality, going back as far as monitoring
data allow. 35 His conclusions on air pollution control generally
31 ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVES, supra note 8, at 13-16.

32 Xiang Dong Qin, Economic Development and Environmental Quality - A Look at the
Environmental Kuznets Curve (1998) (unpublished dissertation, Clemson University) (on file
with Clemson University Library).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., INDUR M. GOKLANY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE STATE OF HUMANITY

(Political Economy Research Center, PERC Policy Series No. PS-21, 2001), available at
http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps2 l.pdf.
35 See INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR (1999) [hereinafter CLEARING THE AIR];
Indur M. Goklany, EmpiricalEvidence Regarding the Role of Nationalizationin Improving U.S.
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parallel Lomborg's: air quality has improved significantly in recent decades.3 6 But Goklany does more than examine trends. He
looks for patterns in the data that can be interpreted in human behavior terms.37 On the basis of early actions taken to reduce air
pollution - e.g., city ordinances, common law actions - Goklany
identifies a "period of perception" for each pollutant he examined.38 At first blush one might think that Goklany's time of recognition corresponds to the approaching peak of the EKC and the
Holy Water stage. However, this conclusion is just opposite to the
point he makes in his work. Indeed, Goklany argues that meaningful action was being taken to control air pollution well before the
federal government became involved with statute writing, and he
illustrates his point in terms of that portion of an EKC that occurs
well before the peak. 39 This suggests that the Holy Water period is
more about getting centralized political action underway than
about the sheer necessity of building institutions that protect environmental rights.
Goklany makes this key point at the conclusion of his report
on air pollution control:
One of the justifications for nationalization is that it
was necessary to improve the nation's air quality because
"states had failed to act" and they "could not be trusted to
adopt adequate environmental controls" because of interstate
competition for business; hence, "Congress imposed national
regulations to control pollution only after its efforts to prod
states to act had failed."
In fact .... the empirical data ... show there was remarkable progress in improving air quality prior to nationalization becoming effective. n

III. COMMAND AND CONTROL OR COMMON LAW
Goklany's conclusion underlines part of the political rhetoric
that reinforced the watershed political decision made in the late
1960s that shifted environmental protection policy from the states
Air Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 27 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P.
Morriss eds., 2000) [hereinafter Empirical Evidence].
36 Empirical Evidence, supra note 35, at 48.
37 Id. at41-42.
38 Id. at 39-40.
19 Id. at 41-42.
40 Id. at 44 (citations omitted) (quoting John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under
the Clean AirAct, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1193 n.37 (1995) & Robert V. Percival, Environmental
Federalism:HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1995)).
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to the federal government. That decision was about property
rights. It was a choice as between private property rights protected
by common law coupled with community and state action 4 1 and
regulatory property rights spawned and enforced by statute law.42
The choice made can be visualized as a fork in the policy road that
leads to various property rights institutions.4 3 Private property
rights and common law protection head in one direction; regulatory property rights and statutes go in the other direction. The
regulatory path was taken 30 years ago, and a huge amount of
regulatory concrete has been poured since then. The decision to
centralize truncated, or at least filtered the continued evolution of,
common law environmentalism. There is no way for us to know
how common law would have evolved in such an environment, but
the case law would have undoubtedly been enriched by 30 years
experience with pollution cases.
To suggest that common law protections will be more dominant in a more optimistic world, is to suggest that statute-based
regulation will wither away. But rather than expecting the sudden
appearance of the equivalence of jack hammers breaking up the
concrete and deregulating, we should rather expect to see some
erosion at the margin, some experimentation with market-based
regulation that calls for common law contracting, greater recognition of the relative merits of state and local experimentation and
control, 44 and taking the private property, common law, route for
newly identified problems.45
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
Bjorn Lomborg's controversial good news treatise is fortified
by a substantial body of empirical work that supports the idea that
common law and community, no matter how discredited by Holy
Water evangelists, can provide protection for an important part of
41 For discussion of this point, see BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON LAW AND COMMON
SENSE
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1997).
42 Regulatory property rights

is a notion developed and discussed in Wiener, supra note 6.

43 Bruce Yandle, Legal Foundationsfor Evolving Property Rights Technologies,
in THE
TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, 9-10 (Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill eds., 2001).
44 For a recent report on action and possibilities, see Jonathan Adler, Let Fifty Flowers
Bloom: Transforming the States into Laboratoriesof Environmental Policy, 31 ENVTL L. REP.

11284 (2001), available at http://www.federalismproject.org/masterpages/environment/
flowers.pdf.
45 The prospect for this is seen in EPA's recent call for comments on the
market-based
approach for managing water quality. The proposal calls for watershed or river basin management based on contracting, which clearly means increased use of common law and a reduction
in the use of technology-based command-and-control regulation. See Notice of Public Information Collection(s), 67 Fed. Reg. 34,710 (May 15, 2002); Bruce Yandle & Brian Mannix, Public
Interest Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Water Quality Trading

Policy, Mercatus Center, at http://www.mercatus.org/waterquality.pdf (June 26, 2002).
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the environmental rights bundle. This is not the same thing as
predicting that 30 years of regulation will be neutralized and that
common law will assume its pre-1960s' status. Nor is this a prediction that Lomborg's treatise will lead to a mass epiphany where
thousands of regulatory rooters will suddenly exclaim that they
have seen the light and become common law environmentalism
advocates. This is not about a contest between two legal institutions. It is about designing the least-cost way to provide meaningful protection of environmental rights.
The prediction that comes with this review is that common
law logic that focuses on practical information about the circumstances of time, place, and harm, and even common law protection,
will enter the policy arena with greater force. The one-suit-fits-all
protection afforded by statutes and regulation may be necessary in
an age of Holy Water when many are led to believe that humanity
is engaged in a goal-line stand against environmental demons. But
the strictures of regulation are costly and often can be counterproductive. Perhaps, with the all-clear being heard, the more sophisticated common law can once again be an important component of
the panoply of institutions that delivery environmental protection.

